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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: LE ADERSHIP EFFECTS  
Surprising as it may sound, the role of leaders in shaping voters’ 
behaviour remains an open question to political science. If we were to rely 
on the general impression, leaders probably exert a strong influence on the 
vote. At least, this is the picture given by the media and politicians 
themselves most of the time. Yet political scientists have not achieved any 
definite agreement on the matter. 
The first scholar approaches to the issue within electoral research 
tended to lessen leadership effects on voting behaviour. Hence, the view 
presented in The American Voter (Campbell et al., 1960) and other works 
by the influential “Michigan school”, gave preeminence to other, more 
deep-rooted political attitudes, such as partisan identification, which were 
thought to develop in early stages of political socialization, thus strongly 
influencing the shaping of later, less stable attitudes, such as the 
evaluations of political candidates. This does not mean that the importance 
of leaders was denied altogether. In fact, leadership was often claimed to 
be a powerful factor of short-term electoral change, even if it was accepted 
that leader evaluations were heavily affected by more basic political 
predispositions (see, for instance, Stokes, 1966). 
With the growing dominance of the rational choice perspective, 
electoral research put emphasis on those elements that are central to that 
paradigm. From a Downsian point of view, the fact that personal 
evaluations of candidates enter the calculus of voting is seen as “irrational”, 
and therefore they are left aside (Popkin et al., 1976). Beginning in the 
1980s, the topic has been payed some more attention, specially (and most 
valuably) from the perspective of cognitive political psychology, and there 
exists now a sizeable body of literature devoted to candidate images and 
their electoral effects. 
Nevertheless, leaders have always been a topic of secondary 
interest in the electoral research agenda. Beyond ignoring it, what has 
remained as the conventional academic wisdom, if anything, is that leaders 
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do not matter, or at least that they do not matter as much as other factors, 
like ideology or party attachment. Hence there appears to be an important 
gap between the common impression (“leaders are important”) and that of 
the the academy (“they are not”). 
Yet there are reasons to expect that leaders matter now more than 
they did in the past. Even if they were irrelevant some time ago, certain 
recent developments registered in modern democracies have produced 
what has been called a process of personalisation of politics by which 
leaders may have become increasingly decisive in elections. This process 
of personalisation may be identified in at least four different levels1: 
a) Institutional level. This applies mainly to parliamentary regimes, 
where leadership effects are supposed to be remarkably less 
consequential than under presidential systems. Prime ministers in 
parliamentary democracies hold a less prominent and presumably 
less powerful position than presid nts in presidential democracies. 
This is so because (1) presidents are directly elected by the people, 
while prime ministers are choosen by the parliament; (2) presidents 
have a fixed term limit and can hardly be removed from office, while 
prime ministers are responsible before the parliament and therefore 
their survival depends on its support; and (3) in presidential regimes, 
the executive power lies in presidents themselves, as individuals, 
whereas in parliamentary regimes it has a collective nature, since 
government decisions are formally taken by a council of ministers. 
However, by means of the growth of the welfare state, “rationalized 
parliamentarism”, and the monolytic behaviour of parliamentary 
groups, parliamentary systems have been transformed in the 
postwar period to yield more powerful, stable, and visibible 
executives with more powerful, stable, and visibible prime ministers 
to the forefront. In other words, parliamentary systems have moved 
towards presidentialism; they have been “presidentialis d”. 
b) Political communication. The rise of television has dramatically 
transformed the process of political communication. Nowadays, 
television is the main source of political information for most of the 
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citizens of advanced democracies. At the same time, he mass 
media have turned out to be more independent and become a power 
on themselves, with their own goals and a benefit-driven logic that 
favours entertainment over public concerns. Political campaigns are 
deeply conditioned by these changes, in a way that makes leaders to 
appear more prominent to the electorate. Now are the media who fix 
the rules and parties who fit to follow them. And the media demand 
images, people, and drama, rather than words, contents, and 
scrupulous analysis. Through the audiovisual media, political 
candidates become the main star of the news, the basic link between 
parties and the electorate. 
c) The electorate. During the second half of the 20th century, modern 
societies have experienced a number of changes that have deeply 
affected the nature of the electorate. The cleavage structures have 
eroded as social disparities diminished, and group identities are now 
less marked than they were decades ago (Crewe & Denver, 1985; 
Dalton et al., 1984). Moreover, there has been a significant increase 
in the average levels of educational attainment and political 
information (Dalton, 1996). Voters are now more sophisticated, less 
prone to follow the traditional cues (party, class) and more open to 
the influence of short-term factors such as that of p litical leaders. 
d) Political parties. Mass parties have given rise to the so-called “catch-
all party”, a party whose main concern is to win elections to achieve 
office, eager to sacrifice ideological concretization in order to get 
votes from all social groups (Kircheimer, 1966). Consequently, the 
attractiveness of catch-all parties is built upon performance and 
leadership issues. Leaders, in particular, achieve an unprecedented 
status within the organization and stand as its more visible asset 
before the el ctorate; today’s political parties are unequivocally 
leader-centered. 
The explanation of the process of personalisation is still “highly 
impressionistic” (MacAllister, 1996: 287) and needs for empirical 
verification, but it nevertheless seems plausible. 
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CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUN D: CATALAN POLITICS  
Catalonia is one of the 17 autonomous comunities of Spain. But it 
is not only so. It also has a strong 'national identity', a language 'of its own', 
and a history of frequent conflicts with Spain. If not a nation state, Catalonia 
would clearly be a 'nation' in cultural terms2. 
Democracy and self-government were always a twofold request for 
Catalan people. Therefore, after the return of democracy in Spain, self-
government was achieved for the Basque Country and Catalonia, nd this 
brought about the autonomic system of the Spanish Constitution –a sort of 
halfway between a regional system and a proper federal State. Since 1980, 
regular elections have been held to choose the Catalan Parliament, and so, 
the President of the Generalitat (the institution of self-goverment). 
The electoral system for the election of the Parliament is a list PR, 
following the d’Hondt formula, plus a 3% threshold, computed in each of 
the four districts. Aside from minor exceptions, the Catalan Parli ment have 
always had five parties represented: the Catalan Nationalists 
(Convergència i Unió); the Socialist Party (PSC- OE, a party federated to 
the Spanish Socialist Party); the Spanish Conservatives, or Centrists, or 
Christian Democrats, or whatever (first as UCD, now as PP); the Catalan 
Independentists (ERC); and the post-communists (under different labels, 
now as ICV). Since the first elections in the post-war period, the 
Nationalists were always the majority in the Chamber, and their leader, 
Jordi Pujol, has been the president of the Generalitat. See the election 
results in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Election Results to the Catalan Parliament, 1980-1999 
 1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 
CiU 27.68(43) 46.56(72) 45.49(69) 46 (70) 40.83(60) 37.7 (56) 
PSC 22.33(33) 29.95(41) 29.63(42) 27.43(40) 24.81(34) 37.85(52) 
UCD, PP 10.55(18) 7.66(11) 5.29 (6) 5.94 (7) 13.05(17) 9.51(12) 
ERC 8.87(14) 4.39 (5) 4.12 (6) 7.92(11) 9.46(13) 8.67(12) 
PSUC, ICV 18.68(25) 5.55 (6) 7.72 (9) 6.47 (7) 9.68(11) 2.51 (3) 
Others 11.89 (2) 5.89 (--) 7.75 (3) 6.24 (--) 2.16 (--) 2.83 (--) 
Entries are vote percentages (over total votes cast). Number of seats appear in 
brackets 
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In ideological terms, the Catalan Nationalists are a coalition of 
liberals and christian-democrats. However, they maintain a certain 
ideological diversity, with some officials who would adhere more to 
conservative ideals, and some who would perceive themselves as almost 
social-democrats. The diversity is being well managed basically by three 
factors: the uniting nationalist ideal, the authority of the leader, and the 
posts which the government provides. From this Catalan government, the 
Catalan Nationalists have seen three different parties and four presidents in 
the Spanish government. With all of them, and at different junctures, they 
have both strongly cooperated and strongly quarreled. Perhaps due to this 
combination, they have been seen as the party option which would develop 
the self-government with a deeper reassurance. During this long time, their 
main occupation has been the construction of self-government, both in 
institutional terms (the development of the Catalan institutions) and in 
socio-political terms (assembling their model of motherland). The Catalan 
Nationalists are very much the personal making of its leader, Jordi Pujol. 
As with all charismatic leaders, his succession is being problematic. The 
consecutive candidates to the post have either died, been involved in 
scandals, or retired with some fatigue.  
The Socialists have always been the second party in the Catalan 
Parliament, and –at a long distance of any other minor parties– th  main 
opposition force. However, their strength is somewhat higher than this fact 
may imply. They have been the party which most votes has attained at 
every local election and at every general election (ie, to the Spanish 
Parliament) contested in Catalonia. This means that the Catalan socialists 
have provided important political elites to both the local level and the 
Spanish level. Curiously enough, none of them contested an election to the 
Catalan Parliament until very recently. Only on 1995, the socialist Mayor of 
an average-size city was the socialist candidate to the presidency of the 
Generalitat. And only on the recent 1999 elections, the idolised Mayor of 
Barcelona finally decided to be the socialist candidate. 
In conclusion, if the assumption that regional level voting is 
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particularly prone to be affected by leadership effects, Catalonia 1995-1999 
are the elections where and when it should be noticed. 
DATA AND METHOD 
This paper makes use of individual data from the electoral surveys 
regularly conducted by the Spanish official polling agency (the Cen ro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas) in Catalonia. We shall look at four (five) 
consecutive regional elections/surveys: 19843, 19884, 19925, and 19956. All 
surveys were conducted shortly after the holding of the respective regional 
election and hence include a reliable vote recall. Our dependent variable is 
always two-party choice, so that the analyses are restricted to the sample 
of respondents who vote for one of the two main parties of the Catalan 
party system, the Socialists (PSC) and the Nationalists (CiU). This variable 
is scored 1 for PSC voters and -1 for CiU voters. 
In order to assess the actual impact of political candidates on 
voters’ choices, we make use of four distinct research strategies. First, we 
look at the explanations given by voters themselves as the motives for their 
choices. In this model, which we have labelled as the “univariate model”, 
we report the answers obtained either through open questions asking for 
the main reason for your vote, or by means of closed questions which 
prompt respondents to pick one ore more reasons out of a list that includes 
the leader among other possibilities (party, ideology, etc.). 
Second, we estimate a “bivariate model” by regressing vote choice 
on respondents’ evaluations of leaders. Our leaders variable just measures 
the difference between the socialist and the nationalist candidates’ feeling 
thermometers7. This variable, as all other independent variables used in the 
following analyses, was recoded between 1 and -1, being 1 the most 
favourable evaluation for the Socialists and -1 is most favourable 
evaluation for the Nationalists. 
Third, in the “multivariate model”, we re- stimate the impact of 
leader evaluations on the vote when adding controls for other relevant 
factors. The choice of factors is necessarily constrained by the availability 
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of the adequate questions in our surveys. After some testing, we finally 
decided to exclude those variables that, though presumably important, 
were not available for one or more of the years: 
· AGE: since the elder are more likely to support the Nationalists, this 
variable is recoded so that 1 (the highest pro-socialist score) is the age 
of the oldest respondent, and -1 (the most favourable score for the 
Nationalists) is that of the oldest, being 0 the mean age of the sample. 
· WORKER: coded 1 for workers, -1 for all others. 
· ORIGIN: ranges from -1, for native Catalans with Catalan-born parents, 
to 1, for respondents born in any other region from non-native parents. 
Intermediate categories are for natives and non-natives with parents 
mixed origins (one Catalan-born, the other born elsewhere). 
· LANGUAGE: knowledge of the Catalan language, with score -1 for 
those with the highest knowledge and 1 for the lowest. 
· RELIGIOUS PRACTICE: respondent’s stated degree of (Catholic) 
religious practice –generally expressed as mass attendance, and 
measured by a closed question. Score -1 corresponds to the most 
religious, 1 to the least. 
· NATIONAL IDENTITY: respondents were asked to say whether they 
felt “Only Catalan”, “More Catalan than Spanish”, “As Catalan as 
Spanish”, “More Spanish than Catalan”, or “Only Spanish”. Recoded so 
that -1 is the score for those who feel “Only Catalan”, 1 for those who 
feel “Only Spanish”. 
· LEFT/RIGHT IDEOLOGY: respondent’s placement on a 10-point scale 
from “Left” to “Right”. Recoded so that 1 is the position most to the Left 
and -1 is the position most to the Right. 
· CATALAN NATIONALISM SCALE: respondent’s placement on a 10-
point scale from a “Catalanist” (or “Nationalist”) position to a “Non-
catalanist” (or “Non-nationalist”, or “Centralist”, or “Spanishist”) position. 
Score -1 corresponds to the most Catalanist position, 1 to the least. 
· PARTY PROXIMITY: difference between respondent’s stated proximity 
to the socialist and the nationalist parties. Proximity to each of both 
parties was measured through a 5-point scale, ranging from “Very 
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close” to “Very distant”. The most proximate to the Socialists (most 
distant to the Nationalists) are scored 1, the most proximate to the 
Nationalists (most distant to the Socialists) are scored -1. 
In the multivariate model, all independent variables are entered 
simultaneously to the regression. By contrast, our fourth and last analysis, 
the “Block Recursive Model”, we estimate the effect of every factor on the 
vote using a hierarchical, block-recursive model. In this case, statistical 
estimations are driven by theoretically-b sed assumptions about the causal 
order of independent variables. Thus, as is shown below, we assess 
leadership effects on the assumption that candidate evaluations are closer 
to the vote decision than national identity, and hence we must take into 
account that the former might be affected by the latter. 
RESULTS  
The Univariate Model 
The easiest way of testing the impact of the leader on the people's 
vote is simply asking them. There are regular survey questions on what are 
the reasons people assign to their votes. It is an exercise of auto-
psychoanalysis which polls tend to ask for. Table 2 shows the results of 
such a question for our 1999 survey. 
 
Table 2 
The Univariate Model, 1999 
 Socialist voters Nationalist voters Both 
Party positions 6.9 29.8 19.4 
Party ideology 24.7 8.8 16.0 
Loyal voting 21.2 13.5 17.0 
Leader 19.4 12.6 15.7 
Government record  26.6 14.4 
Negative voting 23.3 4.7 13.2 
Others + NA 4.5 4.1 4.3 
Entries are % of voters who choose that reason from a given list 
 
Taking both electorates together, the two items emphasising the 
proximity to parties reach a 35% (19.4%+16%); loyal voting comes next 
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(17%); and the leader appears as the next reason of the vote (15.7%). 
Government record and negative voting lag behind the leader as the 
reason of the vote. In conclusion, the leader seems to be an important 
reason of the vote, but not a dominant one. 
This is also true for each electorate taken separately. Nationalist 
voters tend to priorise the party (29.8%+8.8%); the government record 
comes to an outstanding second place (26.6%), which is reasonable given 
its incumbency; and then comes loyal voting (13.5%) and the leader 
(12.6%). It has to be emphasised that we cannot decide whether loyal 
voting expresses a party loyalty or a candidate loyalty, since the nationalist 
candidate has always been the same. Socialist voters also priorise the two 
items related to the party (6.9%+24.7%); then comes negative voting 
(23.3%); loyal voting (21.2%); and only afterwards appears the leader 
(19.4%).  
The conclusion is clear. Even in a competed and highly 
personalised election as it was that of 1999, leaders do not come as 
dominant reasons for justifying the vote. They are important, but not 
dominant. As a way of contrasting the previous results, Table 3 shows the 
same analysis for our 1995 survey (the appendix show the same analyses 
for previous surveys). Notice that the altered format of the survey question 
may explain a great part of the difference. 
 
Table 3 
The Univariate Model, 1995 
 Socialist voters Nationalist voters Both 
Government performance 6.2 27.8 20.8 
Leader 16.8 21.1 19.7 
Party proximity 25.4 14.6 18.1 
Party programme 13.2 12.7 12.9 
Spanish political situation 15.1 12.6 13.4 
Nationalist backing to Spanish government 5.1 7.8 6.9 
Each reason is asked in a separate question. Entries a e % saying that reason is 
very important. Do not have to add 100 
 
Taking both electorates together, there are three reasons which 
voters tend to put forward rather frequently: government performance 
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(20.8%), leader (19.7%) and party proximity (18.1%). If we were to add the 
two items referring to the parties, the party would come as the first reason 
for more than 30% of both electorates (18.1%+12.9%) and leader would 
become third. Being second or third, it seems clear that leaders reached 
some more importance in 1995 rather than in 1999.  
Among socialist voters, primary weight was given to the party items 
(25.4%+13.2%), and the leader comes second at a long distance (16.8%). 
Among the voters of the incumbent Nationalist Party, government 
performance (27.8%) is unsurprisingly seen as more important. The second 
position is arguable once again. The leader (21.1%) seems to be the 
second more important reason of the vote, but adding the two party items 
(14.6%+12.7%) would heighten the position of the party above the leader. 
In any case, it seems clear that the leader of the nationalists was much 
more a vote winner in 1995 than it was in 1999. Is this the expression of a 
long term evolution? Table 4 tries to answer this question. 
 
Table 4 
Votes for the Nationalist Leader, 1984-1999 
 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 
 35.7% 25.3% 25.0% 21.1% 12.6% 
Entries are % of nationalist voters stating the leader was the reason of their vote
 
The answer is yes. The percentage of nationalist voters stating the 
leader was the reason of their vote has gone from an astonishing 35.7% to 
a mere 12.6%. It seems clear therefore, that the electoral appeal of the 
nationalist leader has been seriously decreasing through time.  
This Univariate Model is exposed to an important criticism. People 
do not have to be conscious of the reasons of their vote. In fact, we know 
that people are rather bad analysts of their own behaviour: they may have 
the tendency to overstate virtuous interpretations of their acts, to answer in 
terms of common stereotypes, or many other erroneous expositions of the 
causes of their votes. For instance, it may be that people do not admit they 
voted for the leader because this is seen as unsophisticated, whereas 
voting for an ideology is seen as more respectable. 
If we are to build a scientific explanation of people's votes we 
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cannot rely on their own justifications, but on empirical relationships 
between two separate variables. For instance, if we were to test whether 
social class exercises an impact on the vote or not, we would not ask 
people their opinion on this controversy. We would probably estimate their 
social class in some way; then ask them their vote on a separate question; 
and finally compute some measure of statistical association between the 
two separate variables. This is the procedure which follows the Bivariate 
Model, in the next subsection. 
THE BIVARIATE MODEL 
As section 0 points out, the surveys provide us with a rather 
standard measure of people's evaluation of leaders. The Bivariate Model 
will estimate the impact of these evaluations on the probability of voting 
either Socialist or Nationalist. We want to measure what is the growth in the 
probability of voting the Socialist Party, when the voter increases in one 
unit the comparative evaluation of the socialist leader. In order to measure 
this, we rely on Bivariate OLS regression models. Table 5 shows the 
unstandarised regression coefficients of such models. It also shows the 
same models using two alternative measures of the independent variable –
evaluation of the leader. 
 
Table 5 
The Bivariate Model, 1984-1995 
 Measure used for the evaluation of the leaders (independent variable) 
 Comparative Nationalist leader Socialist leader 
1984 1.46 0.85 0.60 
1988 1.39 0.79 0.59 
1992 1.65 1.01 0.64 
1995 1.74 0.86 0.87 
Entries are bivariate unstandarised regression coefficients between the leader 
evaluation and the vote. All coefficients are significant at a 0.01 level 
 
The first column of Table 5 shows the electoral effect of a growth of 
one unit in the comparative evaluation of the socialist leader8. In practical 
terms, this means that if the 1984 voter moved from a balanced evaluation 
  14
of the two leaders (ex: 5-5), to an evaluation which was a tenth more 
favourable to the socialist leader (ex: 6-5), the probability of voting for the 
socialists increased in 0.146. In 1988, this remained about the same 
(0.139), and went up to be more than 0.16, and up again to be 0.174. 
Another example for 1995: in order for a given voter to increase the 
probability of voting for the socialists in an astonishing 50%, it was just 
needed to move him/her from a balanced evaluation of the leaders (ex: 5-
5), to an evaluation which was three positions favourable to the socialist 
leader (ex: 7-4). 
Table 5 also shows the electoral effect of each leader taken 
separately. Evaluations of the nationalist leader have a greater impact in 
the first three elections, but not anymore in the 1995 election. This reaffirms 
the alluded diminishing electoral effect of the nationalis  leader. 
 The Bivariate Model is also subject to a serious criticism. The 
model does not contain any cause of the vote other than the evaluation of 
the leader, and this implies that any observed impact of the evaluation of 
the leader on the vote may be as much a genuine impact as a 
consequence of a mispecification of the model. For instance, an 
association between Leader Evaluation and the Vote might be just the 
consequence of the impact of Party Proximity on both variables, and not 
the consequence of a genuine impact. Therefore, it is arguable that Table 5 
only shows spurious relationships. In order to confront this criticism we 
should control the Bivariate Model for all other possible causes of the vote. 
This means estimating a multivariate regression model in which the Vote is 
the dependent variable and the indepependent variables are Leader 
Evaluation, Party Proximity, Left/Right Ideology, and any other variable 
which may appear as a feasible predictor of the vote. This is done in the 
next subsection. 
The Multivariate Model 
A multivariate OLS regression model was computed for each 
election with Vote Recall as the dependent variable and all variables which 
could be thought of having an effect on the vote: Age, Language, Worker, 
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Origin, Religiosity, National Identity, Nationalism, Left/Right Ideology, Party 
Proximity and Leader Evaluation. Other variables were excluded from the 
analyses because they attained no significant impacts on the vote, and 
even some other variables were excluded from the analyses because they 
were only available in some of the surveys. Table 6 shows the regression 
coefficients of such models. Given that all variables were recoded between 
+1 (the value most favourable to the Socialist Party) and -1, each 
unstandarised coefficient is interpretable as the variation in the probability 
of voting the socialists when a given voter moves from a neutral position on 
that variable to the position which is the most favourable to the socialists.  
 
Table 6 
The Multivariate Model, 1984-1995 
 1984 1988 1992 1995 
Constant -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 (-0.02) 
Age 0.14 (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) 
Language (0.05) 0.10 0.18 0.19 
Worker (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) -0.06 
Origin 0.09 (0.03) 0.08 (0.07) 
Religiosity 0.09 (0.05) (-0.04) (-0.00) 
National Identity 0.10 (0.02) (0.03) (-0.04) 
Nationalism (0.01) (0.02) 0.08 (0.00) 
L/R Ideology 0.42 0.52 0.44 (0.12) 
Party Proximity 0.94 0.84 0.78 1.09 
Leader Evaluation 0.36 0.35 0.5 0.65 
Entries are multivariate unstandarised coefficients of a regression on the vote. Non-
significant regression coefficients are in parentheses (p>0.05) 
 
As could be expected, the variables which stay closer to the vote 
decision attain a greater impact on the vote. Party Proximity is always the 
decisive variable. In second place, come Left/Right Ideology and Leader
Evaluation, not necessarily in this order. The fourth place goes to 
Language, which is meritory because it is an structural-not ttitudinal-
variable, and therefore it is very distant from the actual vote decision. 
Conversely, some variables-like Nationalism-which are assumed to be of 
primary importance, very seldom tend to exercise any significant influence 
on the vote. 
The coefficients for Leader Evaluation are of primary importance to 
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us. They are always among the highest coefficients which means that 
clearly the impact of leadership over the vote is powerful. Perhaps not as 
much as that of Party Proximity, but powerful nonetheless. However, they 
are much weaker than those of the Bivariate Model. Introducing controls for 
Party Proximity, Left/Right Ideology, and many others, has reduced the 
estimated impact of Leader Evaluation over Vote Recall to a mere one 
fourth or one third of the previous estimation. This means that the Bivariate 
Model clearly overestimated those impacts. An interesting point is the 
increasing magnitude of the coefficients through time, which was already 
revealed by the Bivariate Model. The Multivariate Model verifies this 
conclusion: the impact of leadership over the vote is increasing through the 
elections. 
Aside from the Language, the rest of the variables which are 
located at the beggining of the causal chain –and so, are very remote to the 
vote decision– do not show any great impact on the vote. National Origin 
only shows significance in two of the four elections studied; and Age, 
Worker, Religiosity, and National Identity in one of the four. This could point 
to the conclusion that Catalan voting does not rely on a structural basis, but 
on explicitly political values and evaluations. However, this might also point 
to a statistical artifact. Given that all the variables are introduced at the 
same time, the more powerful party oriented variables tend to make 
redundant the presence of the more distant structural ones. For instance, 
given that workers tend to be more left-wing, when both variables are 
introduced in the model, the presence of L/R Ideology turns Worker non-
significant. But this does not mean that being worker does not affect the 
vote, it just means that it affects the vote through being leftist.  
In conclusion, there should be some way of capturing the electoral 
effect of distant structural variables, and –o ly afterwards– introducing in 
the model the new party oriented variables to capture the electoral effect 
which was not captured yet by the previous variables. In essence, we 
would need a model with a hierarchical inspiration. This is what the Block 
Recursive Model does in the next subsection. 
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The Block Recursive Model 
The Block Recursive Model arises from a clearly theoretical point of 
departure. There is a causal chain which explains the vote (Campbell et al., 
1960). In this causal chain some variables are more remote and some are 
closer to the vote decision. Presumably, structural variables related to the 
position the voter occupies in society are the most remote. In a second 
stage, values should appear –first, those with no explicitly political content; 
then, explicitly political values. A further stage would include a very special 
type of political values: the attitude towards the parties or the preference for 
one of them. The most commonly known example of such an attitude was 
the indicator of party identification. However, we will use the indicator of 
Proximity to Parties, much more adapted to multiparty systems such as the 
Catalan one. And finally, there should be the variables which could be 
understood as consequences of political values. These variables tend to 
refer to the evaluation the voter does of the context in which the elections 
are contested. Examples of this might be the perception of the economy, 
the assessment of the policies, or the evaluation of the leaders. Given the 
object of this article, we shall introduce only the latter. Figure 1 shows our 
theoretical point of departure for the Block Recursive Model. The 
expression 'Block Recursive' (Miller andShanks, 1996, p. 205) refers to the 
fact that causal arrows only point to one direction, so we assume that 
Political Values may influence Context Evaluation but not the reverse. 
 
Figure 1 
A Block Model of the Vote 
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Identity on the four variables reflecting Social Position. Then, the residuals 
of the regression are interpretable of the part of  National Identity not 
accounted for by the individual's social position; ie, a sort of 'net' national 
identity. We do the same with Religiosity. And then go on to a regression 
model for each Political Value: we regressing Left/Right Ideology on the 
four variables reflecting Social Position, plus the 'net' estimates of 
Religiosity and National Identity. Again, the residuals of this regression are 
interpretable of the part of Left/Right Ideology not accounted for by the 
individual's social position and the individual's pre-political values; ie, a sort 
of 'net' Left/Right Ideology. We go on to do the same with the rest of 
political values, and then we do the same with leader evaluation and, 
finally, with vote recall. Therefore, vote recall is accounted for by the four 
variables reflecting Social Position, plus the 'net' estimates of pre- olitical 
values, plus the 'net' estimates of political values, plus the 'net' estimates of 
leader evaluation. Following this type of model, we re-estimated the effects 
of leadership evaluations on vote recall. The results are show d on Table 
7. 
 
Table 7 
The Block Recursive Model, 1995 
 ATEs Mean St. Adj. Adj. st. ATE x adj. ATE x adj. 
   deviation mean deviation mean st. deviation 
Age 0.16 0.13 0.50 0.13 0.50 0.02 0.08 
Language 0.45 -0.53 0.54 -0.53 0.54 -0.23 0.26 
Worker (0.00) -0.17 0.99 -0.17 0.99 0.00 0.00 
Origin 0.28 -0.08 0.87 -0.08 0.87 -0.02 0.26 
Religiosity 0.21 -0.35 0.50 -0.37 0.47 -0.08 0.11 
National Identity 0.20 -0.15 0.57 0.02 0.45 0.00 0.10 
Nationalism 0.17 -0.14 0.54 -0.04 0.42 -0.01 0.07 
L/R Ideology 1.05 0.16 0.33 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.35 
Party Proximity 1.36 -0.15 0.47 -0.14 0.35 -0.19 0.52 
Leader Evaluation 0.65 -0.17 0.35 -0.12 0.25 -0.08 0.18 
Vote Recall  -0.36 0.93     
Non-significant ATEs are in parentheses (p>0.05) 
 
We first estimated the apparent total effect (ATE) for every 
independent variable. The ATE of a given variable is the unstandarized 
regression coefficient of that variable when we regress all variables on that 
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and previous blocks over the vote (see Miller and Shanks, 1996). We would 
consider that the ATE represents the impact of that variable over the vote, 
when we discount the impact of all other variables which may be "causes" 
of that variable (by "causes", we mean that they are theoretically 
understood to be prior). Since Leader Evaluation is the last variable 
included in the Block Recursive Model, the ATE for that variable includes 
controls for all previous variables. Therefore, the ATE for Leader Evaluation 
on this model is the same than its regression coefficient on the Multivariate 
Model. 
The ATEs for Party Proximity (1.36) and Left/Right Ideology (1.05) 
are particularly strong, as could be expected from orthodox theories of 
Electoral Behaviour. More surprising is the effect of Language (0.45) and 
Origin (0.28), which are larger than we could expect from its remoteness 
from the vote decision. In any case, this reminds us the strength of the 
national cleavage in Catalonia. The ATE for Leader Evaluation is the third 
highest, but it stands at a long distance of the two champions, since it just 
amounts to half of the ATE for Party Proximity. In practical terms, the ATE 
means that moving from a neutral position towards the leaders, to the most 
favourable position towards one of them, increases the probability of voting 
him by 0.33 (0.65/2). 
The fact that the ATE is very high does not imply that the referred 
variable has a great impact on the aggregate election results. For instance, 
Party Proximity shows a high ATE, but this will only have an impact on the 
aggregate election results if the distribution of that variable is schewed 
towards one of the parties. If not, the voters attracted to one side by Party 
Proximity will be cancelled out by the voters attracted to the other side by 
this very same variable. For a given variable to have a decisive impact on 
the aggregate election results it is necessary that the variable is schewed 
towards one of the parties. With this use in mind we went on to estimate 
the mean for each variable (both, the independent variables and the 
dependent variable, and all of them rcoded between -1 and +1, as showed 
on section 0). As Table 7 shows, all variables showed means favourable to 
the Nationalist Party, except Age and Left/Right Ideology, which were 
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biased towards the Socialist Party. The positive sign on the Left/Right 
Ideology variable just shows the moderately leftist stance of the Catalan 
electorate. The positive sign on the age variable is just the reflect of a 
mathematical artifact: the theoretical neutral point of the variable (54.5) falls 
slightly above its observed mean; combined with the fact that younger 
people in our subsample tend to cast a more pro-socialist vote. The 
strongly negative mean of Vote Recall detects (and actually overstates) the 
wide distance between the winner Nationalist Party and the Socialist Party, 
which in fact was 0.24, and not 0.36. 
These estimated means have a clear drawback. Their values are 
presumably affected by the means of variables which are located in prior 
stages of the causal chain. This implies that these values are not a good 
estimation of the net distribution of the population on that variable. For 
instance, the distribution of National Identity is rather schewed in favour of 
the pro-nationalist side (-0.15), but this might be only due to the influence of 
previous variables, such as Language and Origin, which are themselves 
schewed in favour of the pro-nationalist side (-0.53 and -0.08). In order to 
assess the net mean of a given variable, we have to discount the effect of 
all variables which are casually prior to it, thus producing what is known as 
the adjusted mean.  
The adjusted mean of a given variable is computed by regressing 
this variable on all causally prior variables. Then, the constant of that 
regression gives us a good estimation of the schewness of that variable net 
of the effect (which is not due to the influence) of prior variables. For 
instance, the adjusted mean of National Identity is the intercept of its 
regression on Age, Language, Worker and Origin. The attained value 
(0.02) shows that the gross mean (-0.15) was largely influenced by the 
schewness of its predictors. 
Table 7 shows that the means of National Identity, Nationalism and 
–to a lesser extent– Leader Evaluation became closer to the neutral point 
once they were adjusted. Thus showing that the distributions are not as 
pro-nationalist as it seemed at the first inspection. On the other hand, the 
mean of Left/Right Ideology actually increased once adjusted, thus showing 
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that the pro-socialist distribution was actually more schewed than what it 
seemed. 
Once the adjusted means were produced, we went on to estimate 
the aggregate effects of each variable on the electoral results. These are 
computed by multiplying its ATE by its Adjusted Mean. In practical terms, 
this product is a measure of the vote distance between the parties which 
has been "generated" by that variable. The negative coefficients point to a 
contribution of that variable to the Nationalist victory, whereas the positive 
coefficients point to a contribution to the results of the Socialists. On the 
Nationalist side, two coefficients seem especially powerful: Language (-
0.23) and Party Proximity (-0.19) were the variables which most contributed 
to their victory. On the Socialist side, Left-Right Ideology (0.25) softened 
the Socialist defeat. To a great distance, we find the effects of Religiosity (-
0.08) and Leader Evaluation (-0.08); and very weak effects of Age (0.02), 
National Origin (-0.02), Nationalism (-0.01), National Identity (0.00) and 
Worker (0.00).  
Thus, the contribution of Leader Evaluation to the Nationalist 
victory in 1995 was important but not dominant. It gave the Nationalists an 
estimated distance of eight points, when the overall distance estimated by 
the survey was thirty-six points. In reality, the actual distance between 
Nationalists and Socialists was 517,819 ballots, which means that the 
contribution of the leaders to the aggregate election results was around 
110,978 ballots. Table 8 shows the results of such an analysis for all the 
elections under scrutiny.  
 
Table 8 
Electoral Impact of Leader Evaluation, 1984-1995  
 1984 1988 1992 1995 
ATE x Adj. Mean -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 
Overall Distance 480,492 429,686 492,922 517,819 
Leader Effect 123,510 48,142 218,531 110,978 
 
The aggregate effect of Leader Evaluation fluctuated between -0.02 
and -0.08, which in actual ballots meant between 48,000 and 218,000 
ballots. Whether this is a high or a small figure is a relative question. The 
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first idea which comes to mind is that it never reaches not even a third of 
the distance between the two main parties. Moreover, there are some 
variables which have a much larger aggregate impact, such as ideology, 
language, and sometimes party proximity. This is what Table 9 shows. 
 
Table 9 
Aggregate effects of selected variables, 1984-1995 
 Leader evaluation Party proximity L/R ideology Language 
1984 -0.06 -0.05 0.29 -0.11 
1988 -0.02 -0.09 0.31 -0.16 
1992 -0.08 -0.05 0.18 -0.17 
1995 -0.08 -0.19 0.25 -0.23 
 
After estimating the aggregate effect, we went on to estimate the 
individual impact of each variable on the vote decision. This is computed by 
multiplying the ATE by the Adjusted Standard Deviation. In statistical terms, 
the Adjusted Standard Deviation of a variable is the standard deviation of 
the residuals generated by the regression model used to estimate its 
Adjusted Mean. These estimations are shown on the last column of Table 
7. The variables which have a larger individual impact are Party Proximity, 
Ideology, National Origin, and Language. Only to a certain distnce comes 
Leader Evaluation. This pattern holds for all the elections: Table 10 
summarizes the evolution of some selected variables, and shows that 
Leader Evaluation is regularly the weakest impact on the vote. 
 
Table 10 
Individual effects of selected variables, 1984-1995 
 Leader evaluation Party proximity L/R ideology Language 
1984 0.11 0.42 0.34 0.22 
1988 0.11 0.42 0.43 0.24 
1992 0.14 0.39 0.31 0.29 
1995 0.18 0.52 0.35 0.26 
 
In addition to what has been said, a second clear pattern appears 
in Table 10: the impact of Leader Evaluation has been increasing through 
time. This shows that –even being weak– the leadership effects are 
growing on the individual vote decisions. However, this growth does not 
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occur in the aggregate estimates. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON CATALAN POLITICS  
If a stereotype is persistent in Catalan politics this is the idea that 
the leader of the nationalist party, Jordi Pujol, is its main asset at election 
time. This stereotype has been growing lately, as the time of Pujol's 
retirement approaches, and fears for the electoral fortune of a leaderless 
party spread around.  
If something is proven by this paper is the empirical weakness of 
such a impression. It is true that Jordi Pujol has always contributed to the 
electoral fortunes of the nationalist party but, at least on the elections 
analysed by this paper, his contribution has never been neither decisive nor 
primary. It has not been decisive because his contribution has always been 
much smaller than the actual gap between the two parties. Needless to 
say, this is partly due to the large electoral gap which have produced all the 
elections under scrutiny. Probably, the results would have been different 
with the unavailable 1999 data. And it has not been primary because there 
are at least three variables which are clearly more influential than Leader 
Evaluation. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON LEADERSHIP EFFECTS  
The literature on leadership effects –clearly on an expansive 
tendency since Miller and Shanks (1996)– put forward the idea that leaders 
do not play a capital role in shaping the electoral outcomes. Our results 
confirm –to some extent– this academic hypothesis, which contradicts 
saloon bar knowledge.  
However, our results also amend the hypothesis, because the 
impact of the leaders is not as negligible as th t found by previous 
literature. This difference may be due to two factors. It might be that we are 
dealing with subnational elections where the leaders are more proximate to 
the electorate, while ideologies and parties are less present than in the 
national debate. It also might be that the Catalan party system is still young 
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and parties and ideologies are weaker than in established advanced 
democracies. 
Following this line of argument, we would point to the possibility 
(not addressed on this paper) that much of leaders effect is indirect rather 
than direct. Since Catalan parties and ideologies are so elusive, it seems 
plausible to think that the actions of the party leaders somehow shape the 
perceptions that the electorate form about them. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
1. For a detailed account of this process and and a reference to the Spanish 
case, see Rico (2002: 11-29). 
 
2. Note that the title uses the term regional to conform to orthodox European 
jargon, but this would be wrong in terms of identity. 
 
3. Data come from the CIS survey no. 1413, conducted in April 1984 
(unweighted N=4984). 
 
4. CIS survey no. 1750, conducted in June 1988 (N=2899). 
 
5. CIS survey no. 2033, conducted in November 1992 (N=2470). 
 
6. CIS survey no. 2199, conducted between November-December 1995 
(N=1598). 
 
7. These feeling thermometers asked respondents to give the candidate a score 
between 0 (meaning that the political performance of the candidate is 
assessed as “very bad”) and 10 (“very good”). 
 
8. "One unit" means that the voter moves from a balanced evaluation of the two 
leaders (ex: 5- ), to the most favourable evaluation of the socialist leader (10-
0). Table 5 shows that such an extreme move produces a growth in the 
probability of voting for the socialists which is actually higher than 1. Since this
is mathematically shocking, we shall interpret the coefficients as if the voter 
moved from a balanced evaluation of the two leaders (ex: 5-5), to an 
evaluation which is a tenth more favourable to the socialist leader (ex: 6-5). 
This means that we shall divide the coefficients by 10 for their interpretation. 
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